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Abstract 
This paper is divided in just two main sections. The first section of this paper 
serves conceptual purposes. I lay out a dualist concept of institutions and 
contrast it to related concepts such as organization, norm, and convention. 
The second part looks at institutions in a longitudinal perspective. What 
happens to them over time, how can we explain what happens, and how can 
we intentionally determine what happens to institutions and, as a 
consequence, to those living under these institutions? In this preliminary 
draft version, the reference to East and Central European transitions from 
communist regimes is still casual and unsystematic, but in a later version I 
intend to fill in more complete and specific references to the institutional 
design problems of these countries as they pertain to liberalization, democ-
ratization, and privatization. 
 
4 IHS Reihe Politikwissenschaft No. 19 
The paper “Designing Institutions for East 
European Transformation”was presented at the 
Institute for Advanced Studies on 4 October 1994. 
A first draft was delivered at the Institutional 
Design Conference, Research School of Social 
Science, Australian National University, December 
7 to 8, 1992. A revised version will be published in 
1995 in Robert E. Goodin and Geoffrey Brennan 
(eds.), The Theory of Institutional Design, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
 
5 Offe Designing Institutions 
Contents 
 1 I. The Dual Nature of Institutions 
 5 II. Modes of Institutional Stability and Changes 
 6 1. Stability as a Process 
 7 2. The “Founding” of Institutions: The Problems of 
 “Hyper-rationality” and “Mental Residues” 
 12 3. Challenges, Breakdwons, and Survival Responses 
 15 4. Critique 
 17 References 
6 IHS Reihe Politikwissenschaft No. 19 
This paper is divided in just two main sections. The first section of this paper 
serves conceptual purposes. I lay out a dualist concept of institutions and 
contrast it to related concepts such as organization, norm, and convention. 
The second part looks at institutions in a longitudinal perspective. What 
happens to them over time, how can we explain what happens, and how can 
we intentionally determine what happens to institutions and, as a 
consequence, to those living under these institutions? In this preliminary 
draft version, the reference to East and Central European transitions from 
communist regimes is still casual and unsystematic, but in a later version I 
intend to fill in more complete and specific references to the institutional 
design problems of these countries as they pertain to liberalization, democ-
ratization, and privatization. 
I. The Dual Nature of Institutions 
Let me start with the proposition, widely shared in the sociological, but not 
so in the economic literature on the subject, that institutions embody 
normative intuitions or principles of those who live in or under the institutions 
in question. The relationship between institutions and moral norms is, 
however, not unilateral, but reciprocal and cyclical. Moral agents generate 
and create institutions, and these institutions, in turn, generate moral 
agents: at least, they establish standards, both normative and cognitive, as 
to what is to be held to be normal, what must be expected, what can be 
relied upon, which rights and duties are attached to which positions, and 
what makes sense in the community or social domain for which an 
institution is valid. Institutions accomplish a socializing function in that they 
serve as examples and reminders of how people “ought to” behave and relate 
to each other1, and what they legitimately can expect from each other. They 
play a “preceptorial” role, as Lindblom has called it. Thus, good citizens 
make good institutions, and good institutions are “good” to the extent they 
generate and cultivate good citizens, or the “better selves” of citizens, who at 
least get “used to” and “feel at home” in those institutions, develop a sense 
of loyalty, and come to adopt the cognitive expectations and moral intuitions 
from which are invested the institutions. The presence or absence of this 
feedback loop is the first test by which we can determine whether a given 
social arrangement is an institution or not. 
There is also a second test concerning the quality of institutions: 
institutions must not just perform the task of what we might term “congruent 
socialization,” but they must also function properly, i.e., accomplish the task 
or mission set for them, or be compatible with the supply of resources they 
must extract from their environment. It is exactly in order for an institution to 
be able to accomplish its (more or less specified and defined) imagined 
function or mission that the predominant concern with this outcome must be 
bracketed or suspended. It may even help if these instrumental concerns are 
displaced by a healthy dose of ritualism and conservatism, or an emphasis  
upon the intrinsic value of complying with established and familiar rules.  
It is thus easy to see that the two standards of the quality of 
institutions that I have distinguished are not synonymous. Even if institutions 
(such as the business firm, the university, the hospital, the military, the 
                                                                 
1 From Aristotle on, and not ending with Rousseau, many political theorists have believed 
that institutions, such as the law, the constitution, or, for that matter, the socialist collective 
farm, are capable of “perfecting” human beings, e.g. by turning “ordinary” citizens or workers 
into “good citizens” or workers.  
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church, parliamentary government, marriage, the profession, or social 
security) do generate the most solid support and loyalty of those who belong 
to them (as well as of outside observers), they may still fail in successfully 
coping with the problems they are supposed to cope with, or in extracting 
the resources needed for the implementation of their goals. And conversely, 
such manifest failure does not necessarily undermine the moral support that 
an institution enjoys, as such failure may positively lead to an attitude of 
doctrinaire over-identification on the part of actors with the rules, values and 
routines embodied in the institution that fails. 
Thus both dimensions are conceptually necessary as criteria of the 
viability of institutions, internal socialization and external effectiveness, or 
the consolidation of beliefs, on the one hand, and the implementation of 
goals or the control over resources, on the other. These dimensions do 
obviously correspond to famous pairs of concepts such as Lockwood’s 
“social integration” vs. “systems integration,” or Lipset’s (1981: 64 – 70) le-
gitimacy and effectiveness, or Habermas’(1981) “life world” vs. “system.” 
Using a simpler language, we might also say that an institution in the full 
sense of the term (as opposed to institutional ruins, or degenerate or 
deficient version of it) does survive the dual test of “making sense” and “being 
fit” for its mission.  
Institutions in this sense can be located somewhere in between social 
norms and norm-oriented action, on the one hand, and purposive rational or 
strategic action, on the other. Or rather, they contain elements of both of 
these modes of action, doing things “the right way” and “getting things 
done.” March and Olsen (1989: 23f.) refer to the same dualism when locating 
action and the rules that govern it on a time axis. They suggest that insti-
tutionalized action combines backward looking (“obligatory”) and forward 
looking (“anticipatory”) motivational forces, the first being informed by some 
“logic of appropriateness” and the second by instrumental or strategic 
rationality (“logic of consequentiality,” 160). Particular instances of 
institutionalized action may differ as to the relative weight of these two 
motivational components as well as the reflective awareness of the actors, 
but neither of the two is, by definition, completely absent. Closely related, if 
not identical instances of this sociological dualism are represented by 
distinctions and pairs of concepts such as rules vs. decisions, status vs. 
contract, or necessity vs. preference, order vs. choice, boundaries vs. 
contingency. Institutions are “bridges,” or synthetic arrangements which 
allow for the coincidence of such apparent opposites. To illustrate this 
synthesis, we can think of the institution of private property, which is the 
status right to make contracts according to preferences. Similarly, the 
institution of money generates an enormous range of choices that is 
contingent exactly on the fact that the range of these choices and the value 
of the currency remains exempt from contingent choices. 
Institutions, in a word, inculcate duties and generate outcomes. In 
order to generate the outcomes, they must rely on cognitive and moral 
resources which in their turn, however, are not to be created by 
administrative fiat. “There is no administrative production of meaning.” 
(Habermas 1975: 70; emphasis in original) Consequently, whoever wishes to 
advocate, design, construct, change, or criticize institutions will have to bear 
in mind this dualism and the inherent limits of potential control over meaning. 
There are two competing approaches in the social sciences which both 
fail to appreciate this dualism of institutions. On the one hand, “culturalists” 
and some sociological and philosophical “institutionalists” fail in that they 
advocate and explain certain institutions solely in terms of the social norms 
and values that institutions embody and manage to spread in their social do-
main, while ignoring the systemic “fit” between the institution and its 
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environment.2 On the other extreme, utilitarians notoriously also fail to 
conceptualize institutions in a balanced way, as they place one-sided 
emphasis upon the instrumental aspect of institutions. They advocate or 
defend institutions (such as the market, property rights, or the business firm) 
in terms of their efficiency-enhancing and hence utility maximizing effect, 
and they even explain the presence of certain institutions in given societies 
in terms of their evolutionary superiority, e.g. as to their capacity of 
economizing on transaction costs.3 Methodologically similar is the structure 
of some Marxist arguments, to be found in the writings of Bowles, Gintis, 
Korpi and many others, as they conceptualize at least some institutions as 
the direct and intended outcome of ruling class strategies to achieve ex-
ploitative distributional outcomes.  
Apart from other problems, what the utilitarian, evolutionist and Marxist 
approaches amount to is a denial of the crucial conceptual difference 
between an “institution” and an “organization.” The latter, but not the former, 
can and do actually subordinate (in accordance with Weber’s notion of 
“purposive rationality”) “duties” to (expected) “outcomes.” In organizations 
duties are assigned so as to achieve optimal outcomes. To an extent, it is 
thus entirely a matter of the formal authority of the boss over the employee 
which task the latter will have to perform this afternoon. But only to an 
extent, because the duty assigned affects the role of the employee, not the 
employee as a person; and it is more or less narrowly constrained by nu-
merous institutional rules, e.g., the employee’s status rights associated with 
the work contract and his citizen rights, that limit the range of duties the 
boss is actually entitled to assign.  
The difference between an organization and an institution can thus be 
summed up in three points. (1) Organizational duties are dyadic, while 
institutional rules are triadic, i.e. established and enforced by “third parties” 
who are not part of the institutionalized interaction. (2) Duties are 
subordinate to intended outcomes in organizations, but stand at least on the 
same logical plane in institutions. (3) Organizational duties are much more 
restricted in their scope, validity, and impact upon the person involved; they 
are restricted to the range of discretion that institutions (such as property 
rights, marriage, political parties, the business firm) grant the agents in their 
domain for the pursuit of their purposes.  
To illustrate, the university as an institution does not allow you to 
concoct the data base of your research or to plagiarize the work of other 
scientists (although that can be highly purposive-rational!), but a given 
university as an organization encapsulated in the institution permits certain 
incumbents of certain offices to change the curriculum, if only according to 
certain non-contingent rules.4 
The “triadic” nature of institutions bears elaboration. Institutions depend 
for their viability and survival upon the knowledge and at least tacit consent 
                                                                 
2 “The propensity to social change arising from the functional incompatibility between an 
institutional order and its material base has been ignored by normative functionalists because of 
their concentration on the moral aspects of social integration. ” (Lockwood 1964: 256) 
3 “The bulk of the literature appearing under the label of ‘New Institutional Economics’ 
seems to rest on the assumption that institutional change occurs primarily in an efficiency 
enhancing form.” (Grosser 1993: 23) 
4 Meyer and Rowan (as reprinted in Powell and DiMaggio 1991) have provided a powerful 
argument to the effect that the balance be tween internally assigned duties and rules extracted 
from the institutional environment of the organization, or between organizational and 
institutional functions, is actually shifting towards the latter, as organizations, partly for their 
lack of utility-maximizing algorithms of their own, come increasingly to rely on 
institutionalized rules they adopt from their environment. To the extent this hypothesis is 
valid, the utilitarian view of institutions is further discredited.  
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of “third parties” that are not directly involved in the particular interaction the 
institution regulates. “Working rules5 must be common knowledge and must 
be monitored and enforced. Common knowledge implies that every par-
ticipant knows the rules, knows that others know the rules, and knows that 
others also know that the participant knows the rules.” (Ostrom 1992: 20) 
Institutions – in sharp distinction to conventions6, which are strictly self-
enforcing – are social arrangements which are designed to settle potential 
conflict. For that, they need to be endorsed by “third parties.” If they are 
endorsed in this way, the phenomenon of second-order expectations (or 
“expected expectations,” in Luhmann’s parlance) emerges: What those 
involved in an institutional interaction can and cannot expect from each other 
is itself expected by third parties or outside observers. As they allocate 
privileges, licenses and duties to actors, institutions – in contrast to un-
questioning habits, routines and traditions – establish an order that is 
always potentially contested and hence needs to be tolerated, supported 
and enforced by external actors. 
This potential for conflict is particularly evident in those institutions that 
deal with the jurisdiction over the production and distribution of core values 
such as health, peace, power, knowledge, truth, love, prosperity, mobility, 
esthetic beauty, security (both military and social), friendship, justice, jobs, 
salvation, punishment, education, and the like. The relationship between the 
shape and distribution of procedural rules, restraints, resources, and 
licenses, on the one hand, and these reference values, on the other, can be 
found in implicit theories, ideologies and justifications institutions cultivate 
about themselves which are often enshrined in an institutional “charter.” It 
ultimately depends on the quality, i.e. the compelling power, or immunity to 
critique, of these theories whether or not a particular institution will manage 
to suspend open conflict over the licenses, privileges and rules of which it 
consists. 
Other institutions are less directly and less obviously related to such 
core values, but they still help to establish rules in the absence of which 
friction would occur. Many of these institutions regulate the social use of 
space and/or time, as is the case with parks, markets squares, vacation 
trips, carnival, bank holidays, birthday parties, sports stadiums, party 
conventions, bars, and many others. They have in common that they evoke 
certain themes, routines, and orientations and thus facilitate the interaction 
(or economize on the transaction costs) of those involved, and restrict this 
interaction to a particular range of themes, practises, and premises. The 
strength of these thematic, spatial, status-related, and temporal demarcation 
rules becomes evident in the sentiments of comicality, embarrassment, 
shame, and protest that are aroused if the “wrong” persons do the “wrong” 
things at “inappropriate” places or times.  
Such complex codes concerning who is supposed to do what, when, 
and where, and in what relation to what reference values, help to relieve all 
members of society from decision loads and conflicts – provided that these 
codes are known and serve to shape attention and cognitive expectations 
beyond the group of people directly involved in the institutionally patterned 
activity. In this sense, institutions can be compared to an exoskeleton of so-
cial life. If – and only to the extent that – such demarcation rules are 
common knowledge, institutions perform the function of “saving energy” – the 
energy and costs, that is, that would otherwise have to go into the cognitive 
                                                                 
5 “Working rules” is a synonym for the term “institution” introduced by J.R. Commons 
(1961) 
6 Standard examples are the convention to drive on either the right hand or left hand side of 
the street, or the distribution of characters on the typewriter keyboard.  
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assessment and moral evaluation of what is going on and how “I” should 
relate to what “everyone else” is doing. Institutions unburden action because 
they relieve us from much of the need to generate ad hoc judgements. 
Institutions can also be thought of as a repository of our second-order 
preferences, i.e. the preferences concerning the preferences that we would 
like to have and pursue and with which our unstable and fleeting first-order 
preferences are typically in conflict. Experience shows that it absorbs a lot 
of cognitive as well as moral effort to evaluate the appropriateness of our own 
preferences in the absence of institutions which alleviate this effort.7  
Due to their “energy-saving” features, institutions are not just constraining, 
but also enabling, and much beyond their function of economizing in 
transaction costs that is highlighted by economists. (North, Williamson, 
Schotter, Coase) They are commonly known frameworks of regulation that 
help us to develop they “right” understanding of situations and to anticipate 
what is likely or unlikely to happen. Moreover, the constraint is often only 
marginal, as institutions can be employed for a variety of purposes, without 
any of them being prescribed as the all-dominant one, like in an 
organization. It is this commonly shared knowledge about demarcation rules 
and the expectations based upon this knowledge that provides institutions 
with a measure of counterfactual validity and stability. It is important to 
distinguish between institutions proper and individual cases, instances or 
realizations of the rules that make up the institution. If an organization fails, 
it fails and is no longer there. If an institution fails in a particular instance (a 
marriage, a political party, a state), that does not by itself affect the 
institutional order of which it has been an embodiment. 
Such stability of institutions, and the functions performed due to its 
stability, come at a price. This price is rigidity. On the one side, institutions 
such as the market, the university, the party system, general elections, or 
the business firm make an almost unlimited range of choices available which 
can be selected by combining and recombining the resources and 
interactions possible within them. On the other side, this option-generating 
arrangement itself must be immune from choice. There seems to be a 
correspondence between the range of choice made available within an 
institutional arrangement and the requisite rigidity of the arrangement itself. 
To reiterate, the institution of money can mediate, as it does, innumerable 
transactions only because none of the participants in these transactions can 
intentionally affect the value of money. Similarly, democracy as a preference 
aggregating machinery can only work under a framework of rights that is 
protected by independent courts and at least relatively immune from 
democratic contingencies; for it would be the end of democracy if majorities 
had, for instance, the right to decide that minorities are no longer entitled to 
vote or organize. In both of these and many other cases, the uncertainty of 
outcomes is matched by the certainty of procedures, rules, and parameters. 
                                                                 
7 This “unburdening” effect (Entlastungseffekt), as it has been called by the German 
philosophical anthropologist Arnold Gehlen, becomes evident if we have to relate to a situation 
in which we cannot rely upon the assistance of institutions. One could think of a situation when 
a serious traffic accident has occurred an the police and ambulance do not come for some rea-
son. Similarly, we can think of a distributional conflict the solution of which cannot be 
provided by an institution because the nature of the conflict is so new that no institution for 
processing it has yet been installed. This is the single most important theme in German 
domestic politics right now. Whereas the usual distributional conflict between labor and capital 
is quite solidly institutionalized, the new distribution conflict between the former West and East 
German Länder is still to be resolved not only in substantive, but also in procedural and 
institutional terms. Until it is, the political system as a whole is suffering from an extraordinary 
cognitive and moral burden of determining legitimate and acceptable ad hoc solutions of this 
distributional conflict. 
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The problem of East and Central European transition is that there is too little 
of what I would like to call requisite rigidity of this kind, as the regime which 
could enforce such rigidity has broken down, and therefore too little choice. 
The action that takes place is not under institutions, but about institutions: it 
is all discretion, and no rules governing and constraining discretion. 
II. Modes of Institutional Stability  
and Change 
In this section I want to review the ways in which institutions do – or do not – 
change. As it will turn out, “design” is a rare and unlikely mode of change, 
and even less likely is it that the activity of “designing” is recognized, 
acknowledged and remembered as such. The modes that affect the 
continuity of institutions are discussed under the headings of “stability,” 
“founding,” “breakdown,” and “critique.” 
1. Stability as a Process 
Institutions are not “natural,” but man-made. At the same time, they have a 
nature-like longevity. The first thing we associate with them is stability, as 
do Goodin and Brennan in their introductory paper to our conference: 
“Institutions are entrenched, well-established, relatively stable. They change 
little: only rarely, only at the margins. ” (3) Hegel has captured the dual as-
pect of institutions (of being doubtlessly man-made, but of being at the same 
time also nature-like and often as impossible to change as the law of gravity) 
by the term “second nature.” A popular, though, I submit, deeply misleading 
mechanical metaphor for the stability of institutions is the notion of “inertia.” 
To account for the stability of institutions, it is much more helpful to rely on 
biological rather than mechanical analogies, and to compare institutions to 
“identical reproduction” rather than “inertia.” Such biological metaphor 
highlights the fact that identical reproduction is a process rather than a 
steady state, and that the “identicalness” of the reproduction of a species is 
well compatible with virtually unlimited variations of individual specimens, 
depending upon the complexity of the genetic pool of the species. Identical 
reproduction is, however, itself not unlimited. It can come to an end at a 
point where either identical reproduction stops (cf. the “dying out” of the 
dinosaurs) or where identical reproduction stops (through mutation and 
selection), both of which is also true of social institutions. 
A less metaphorical understanding of the stability of institutions is 
“path dependency.” My interpretation of this rather powerful explanatory 
intuition is this. Path dependency is a mechanism of identical reproduction 
of institutions due to either or both of the two features mentioned above. Not 
only are institutions man-made, but also men institution-made – they are so-
cialized by the educational or “hidden curriculum” effect of institutions into 
the values, norms, and rules embodied in them, and as a consequence they 
know, expect and anticipate that institutions can be relied upon and 
reckoned with (almost like the objects of nature). This curriculum, 
incidentally, must not be so “hidden.” Institution generate vested interest in 
their own preservation, sometimes to the extent that the endogenous rise for 
an alternative arrangement becomes virtually inconceivable. Just think of the 
likelihood that within simple majority, “winner-takes-all” electoral systems a 
coalition emerges that favors proportional representation, whereas a 
transition in the opposite direction appears much more likely. Secondly, as 
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long as institutions function properly and continue to generate tolerable 
levels of outcome, there is no perceived need to think about, and even less 
to try to implement the potentially costly process of innovating institutions or 
of introducing institutional alterations. In short, the stability of institutions is 
based upon a social process of identical reproduction that is driven by an in-
stitution’s socialization effect and its functional viability. 
Furthermore, some institutions become stable by reflectively providing 
for their own stability by institutionalizing what has been called “ultra-
stability.” This happens in either of two ways. The first concerns the degrees 
of freedom that they leave to individual behavior and choice. Institutions 
provide just a framework within which purposive choice remains possible. 
They must be distinguished from rituals where such choice is maximally 
reduced. The more liberal the regime that institutions impose upon agents, 
the less vulnerable they will probably become to disloyalty or attempted 
institutional innovation8 – at least up to a point at which “excessive” 
liberalism will begin to negatively affect the socialization, or preference 
forming, effect upon which the continuity of institutions normally depends. 
Also, institutions protect themselves, as it were, from being strained not only 
through their “framework” character, but also through the possibility they 
provide to actors to switch to other institutional codes in case their behavior 
can no longer be accommodated within the rules of one institution. 
The other stability enforcing mechanism that some institutions provide 
for consists in institutional rules for changing (lower-order!) institutional rules. 
Thus institutions defined by statutory law can be altered according to 
constitutional rules governing the legislative process, and even most 
constitutions contain procedural rules (such as articles 79 – 81 of the 
German Basic Law) which specify which parts of the respective constitution 
can (or conversely cannot) be changed in which way.9 Both of these 
allowances – built-in scope for discretion on behavior (including the switch to 
“neighboring” institutional patterns) and built-in scope for discretion on part of 
the institutional rules themselves – help to (and are explicitly designed to) 
preserve institutional stability through provisions for flexibility in the face of 
changing circumstances and preferences. In these cases, institutions are 
designed to re-design themselves – and through this two-tiered structure to 
escape the need to be explicitly designed anew. 
Within such two-tiered arrangements, very much scope can be opened 
for reform and revision of institutions. As long as some features of the 
institution remain in place, others may be exchanged. In this way, social 
order can be re-negotiated by the agents which are institutionally charged 
with the license and mandate to do so. The most radical case of 
institutionally regulated institutional change is “transicion pactada” or “round 
table talks,” as they have occurred in the Spanish and East European 
transitions from authoritarianism. In such cases, actors which are charged 
with political functions within the old regime coopt and admit other actors 
with no such previous function in order to negotiate new rules and new 
issues. The implication of such cooptation of new actors in regime tran-
sitions may be, as it has been, for instance, in Poland 1989 or in East 
Germany 1990, that the presence of the old, formerly monopolistic actors 
                                                                 
8 “Defensive liberalizat ion” is the apt term that Batt (1991: 387) employs to describe the 
desperate last-minute maneuvers of Czechoslovak and East German leaders to benefit from this 
self-stabilization mechanism in late 1989. 
9 The institutionalized doctrine of papal infallibility and ultimate authority is another case in 
point, to which Roman Catholicism owes much of its ultra-stability, whereas the recent 
Fujimori-coup in Peru is not, as presidential authority to suspend the constitution is not 
provided for by the constitution of that country. 
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serves just as a temporary face-saving device without any substantive 
significance. The least radical and most routine case is when both 
institutional actors and institutional rules remain unchanged and just new 
substantive issues are admitted to the agenda. 
2. The “Founding” of Institutions: The Problems of “Hyper- 
Rationality” and “Mental Residues”  
Diametrically opposed to stability, identical reproduction, path-dependency, 
and ultra-stability are those rare cases in which institutions are actually 
created at a certain point in time and than succeeded to actually perform as 
institutions vis-à-vis both their constituents and their resource environment, 
rather than remaining short-lived blueprints imposed upon agents or simply 
new names for – or new actors in – old institutions. 
The rare conditions that can give rise to the conscious and intentional 
design of institutions – as opposed to the mere design of designs or names 
or facades – are partly well known, at least as far as political institutions are 
concerned. First, the existing institutions that are to be replaced10 by the 
newly designed institutions must be both thoroughly discredited (i.e., have 
failed to perform a congruent socializing function) and, perhaps partly as a 
consequence of that loss of credit, must also have lost their ability to cope 
with functional problems in their environment. Thus economic crises and 
wars, as well as the thorough loss of legitimacy of the regime that has to 
take responsibility for these events, will typically give rise to intentionally 
attempted institutional innovations. To say this is just paraphrasing Lenin’s 
definition of a revolutionary situation as a condition in which the rulers cannot 
continue to rule and the ruled resist the continuation of the rulers’ rule.  
But a further condition must also be present in order for this situation to 
transform itself into one of newly designed and created institutions, as 
opposed to mere breakdown and chaos. This second condition is the 
presence of a model of the new institutional order that is typically not 
invented on the spot, but “imported” and suitably adapted from more or less 
remote points in time or space. Institutional designs are typically copies, 
and they are frequently advocated as such. 
For an illustration of this point, let me dwell for a moment on the 
German case of the post-World War II rebuilding of political and economic 
institutions in both East and West Germany. The first condition of total 
military defeat plus total moral discrediting of the Nazi regime was certainly 
fulfilled. But the second condition for institutional reconstruction was also 
there, namely the ready availability of a positive reference model. As far as 
West Germany was concerned, the reference model was a combined replica 
of the “better past” of the Weimar Republic and its democratic institutions 
plus certain features of the Anglo-Saxon democracies, which were adopted 
in order to immunize the second German republic from the dangers to which 
the first had fallen victim. Moreover, the implementation and enforcement 
mechanism of the new institutions created was “imported”11 as well, 
consisting as it did in the occupation forces of the Western allies. The same 
                                                                 
10 The unique feature and facilitating condition of the American Revolution – and all the 
institutions it created, such as federalism – is probably that it did not really have to replace 
anything, as the new order to be erected was to be built on a terrain that was both physically 
and institutionally “empty space,” and as the location of the “old regime” was geographically 
distant. 
11 Cf. Rousseau’s recommendation that the legislateur should be a foreigner, as he is less likely 
than any domestic agent to take partisan views in the process of law-making and institution 
building. 
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applies of course to the very different process of institution-building that 
unfolded in East Germany after 1945 and in which the “invented tradition” of 
the Weimar Communist Left played the same role as did the adopted 
institutional models of Social Democratic and Christian political forces of 
Weimar and their institutional legacies in West Germany. 
The designing of new institutions occurs through the replication of old 
or spatially distant ones. Before designers can start their job, they will 
typically seek inspiration and legitimacy in a construed model of the past of 
their own society. This past is often schematically subdivided into a 
rejected, though immediate “dark” past and a more distant but celebrated 
“golden” past. 19th century European risorgimento-nationalism and the 
institutions created by it, most importantly the nation state, is a case in 
point. Others are looking around for foreign models to be replicated.12 
Sometimes it is rather easy to distil a workable synthesis of models that are 
being found in the “golden” past and the “golden” West, but sometimes the 
respective models imported from the “past” and the “West” are diametrically 
opposed to each other, as it appears to be the case in much of present-day 
East Central Europe. 
Needless to say, what actually happens in the process of institution 
building is often a far cry from the mere replication of rules that have been in 
operation at other places or times. What interests me in this imaginary 
transplantation of institutions across time and space is not whether such 
transfer has actually taken place, but the function played by the presentation 
of the activity of designing and building institutions as an activity that mainly 
consists in imitating institutions. It looks as if the designers of institutions 
shy away from accepting responsibility in public for what they are really 
doing, and that they tend to hide instead behind the often rather fictive notion 
of imitation or transplantation. 
Imitation, both across national as well as sectoral boundaries, is a 
powerful device of institutional innovation. The rhetoric of “learning from 
others” or “learning from successful examples” is employed in order to play 
down the differences that may exist between sectors and countries, to 
create a deceptive clarity about some evidently and easily acceptable 
superior solution, to mobilize support, and to disguise the creative 
alterations that the supposed “imitation” is likely to involve. Trans-sectoral 
imitation follows the  suggestive analogy that what has worked in one sector 
is bound to work in other sectors as well. In this way, the German social se-
curity system (which is based on mandatory income-graduated contributions 
plus inter-class parity plus self-government of public corporations) has 
spread through continuous imitation from health to old age to unemployment 
to (right now) care for the elderly in the course of more than 110 years. 
If I am right in generalizing that institution designers, whatever their 
creative contribution, tend to be reluctant to confess to their authorship, this 
tendency might follow from an important intuition on their part. This intuition 
can be captured in the following way: It does not help the viability and 
operative success of newly designed institutions if they are perceived by oth-
ers as actually being newly designed. The designer, if seen as such, will 
unavoidably come under the suspicion of trying to impose his particular 
interest or normative point of view upon the broader community, and that 
suspicion alone, unjustified though it may be in some cases, may invalidate 
the recognition and respect of the new institution. It is as if the man-made 
and hence contingent nature of institutional change must be denied and ar-
tificially “forgotten.” Otherwise, the example of the designer will invite others 
                                                                 
12 Cf. the statement by former Polish Finance Minister L. Balcerowicz (quoted in Neuber 
1992: 20): “Poland is too poor to experiment. We will therefore follow working models.” 
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to attempt a different design, the consequence being an overload of 
contingency, complexity, and uncertainty which contradicts the essence of 
what we mean by an institution.  
This skepticism about the “designing” of institutions is of course most 
explicitly argued in conservative political and economic philosophies, such 
as the Hayekian critique of “constructivism” or Oakshott’s critique of political 
rationalism13. The very activity of institution-building, if visible as such, could 
thus easily end up in the hyper-rationality trap (Elster) of “willing what cannot 
be willed.” It cannot be willed because if it is seen as being willed, rather 
than “inherited” or “replicated,” it will be more controversial and less binding 
than if it is seen as a legacy or imitation. Conversely, if newly designed 
institutions can be depicted as being not so new after all, but rooted in some 
respectable past, that may add to their obligatory and preference-forming 
power flowing from that past, as the trust in their capacity for performing the 
functions that they are supposed to perform can be strengthened by the 
pretense that they are just replicas of demonstrably successful models im-
ported from elsewhere. 
This intuition is also reflected in the discourse that institutions cultivate 
about their own history and origin. In the rare cases where individual persons 
are credited with the design and creation of institutions, these authors are 
also attributed charismatic and extraordinary qualities: they are depicted as 
heroes, prophets, saints, founding fathers, pioneers, great statesmen 
(Napoleon, Bismarck, Lenin), or “classical” thinkers who have been active at 
exceptional junctures of history. But more often, reflective discourses about 
the origin of institutions seem to avoid the notion of intentional creation. 
Instead, they rely on subject-less categories by describing the coming-into-
being of institutions as driven by “tradition,” a creeping process of ex-
perimentation and imitation. In this perspective, institutions just “evolve,” 
“develop,” “emerge,” are “discovered,” or “spread,” or their coming into 
existence is thought of as the process of a “vitalistic” emanation of a sub-
jectless idée directrice (Hauriou 1925), all of which is to obscure their origin 
in intentional action of concrete individuals and groups. 
At any rate, too much “tinkering” with institutions, an excessive effort to 
design an redesign them in order to make them turbulence-proof and fit for 
their mission, as well as other visible indications of “designer activism” will 
almost certainly have the unintended effect of both undermining trust and 
committing the authors of such innovations to ever more and ever hastier 
readjustments. Too rapid and too comprehensive institutional reforms may 
easily overtax the support of those affected by them, or it will frustrate the 
expectation generated by the reform process itself that rapid transformation 
also means rapid success. This is the paradox of “designer capitalism” 
(Stark 1992), or capitalism by decree, that we see unfolding in East Central 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. The paradox is compounded if this 
discretionary design of new economic institutions coincides with the 
introduction of democracy by decree and the redefinition of territorial states 
by decree (Offe 1991). If anything, the success and the survival capacity of 
the newly built institutions is likely to depend more on people’s trust, 
compliance, and patience in enduring the transition costs involved than in 
the quality of the design of these institutions themselves. The paradox is 
also exacerbated if it is generally (and probably rightly) understood that the 
institutional choices that are now being made are of the greatest significance 
                                                                 
13 The object of Oakshott’s critique is that “the consciously planned and deliberately executed 
is being considered (for that reason) better than what has grown up and established itself 
unselfconsciously over a period of time.” (1962: 26) 
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for the future power and economic positions of virtually all kinds of actors14, 
and that therefore hardly anyone can be expected nor trusted to make these 
choices in a fair, non-partisan and disinterested way. Nor can anyone among 
the actors who see themselves as potentially negatively affected by newly 
designed institution be expected to keep silent in the process, given the 
vastly expanded opportunities for raising their voice through the means of the 
newly established democratic process15.  
The paradox would thus seem to boil down to the painful contradiction 
that it is exactly at the moment when the rapid introduction of new political 
and economic institutions is most urgently needed, there is, for systematic 
reasons, no one who could possibly be entrusted with the responsibility to 
design them – and neither is there some external agent who could effectively 
impose them from the outside16 nor a widely accepted model in some “better 
past” of post-Communist societies that could be revived. 
As the leaders of post-Communist societies emphasize again and again, 
they “have no time” to argue about principles. The urgency of the economic 
condition forces them to adopt an instrumental and outcome-oriented 
perspective. However, if from this perspective they select Western 
institutional models (political parties, social policies, a banking system, 
local self-government, or whatever), they actually copy something that is 
different from the original. For no Western political, economic, or social in-
stitution has been invented for the purpose of extricating an entire group of 
societies from the conditions of state socialism and its ruins. The original of 
the institutions that are now being copied has rather come into being for 
other or at least additional reasons17 than the functions it has eventually 
turned out to perform, these reasons being the rights, traditions, and princi-
ples embodied in these institutions – “political” arguments (Hirschman). The 
identities and arguments on which institutions were originally based in the 
West have helped to shape the political and economic culture on which 
                                                                 
14 T he crux of the situation is the coincidence of high levels of transparency and salience. 
Whatever institution choice is made (concerning, for instance, the mode of privatization or 
electoral law), there is no “veil of ignorance” that would allow to decide these questions on their 
own merits rather than in the light of immediate consequences that are easily anticipated. For 
instance, whatever the merits of early elections vs. late elections, proportional representation 
vs. pure majority, local government autonomy vs. centralization, private vs. public television, 
or presidentialism vs. parliamentary government, it is evident in most cases which alternative 
will benefit whom. Whoever advocates either of these and many other alternatives will almost 
automatically be suspected, whatever his arguments are, to do so in the service of one particular 
interest. 
15 A conclusion from the observation that democracy might stand in the way of the designing 
market and property institutions – a conclusion that appears as consistent in its logic as it is 
cynical in its consequences – is that “capitalism” must take precedence over “democracy” if the 
“healthy” path of institutional innovation, such as it has been chosen in South Korea and Chile, 
is to be accomplished. Cf. for this argument Schwarz 1992. 
16 Such an external agent would have to have, in order to effectively impose an institutional 
design, either unquestioned intellectual authority and expertise or be in a position of un-
challenged political, economic, or even military power. Neither the members of various 
international advisory commissions that have become active in East European countries nor 
the IMF can lay claim to either of these qualities.  
17 The locus classicus of this argument is of course Max Weber’s demonstration in his 
Protestant Ethic that the “spirit of capitalism” was not inculcated for the sake of gain, but for 
the sake of spiritual salvation, and that its “real” functions were as much by-products as its 
intended functions were failures. A parallel argument, this time not concerning salvation but 
concerning peace, order, and freedom was made by Albert Hirschman (1977: 130) who argues 
that the case for capitalism in the 17th and 18th centuries was made not for the sake of 
material prosperity, but for the political “virtue of imposing restraints on princely caprice, 
arbitrary government, and adventurous foreign policies.” 
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institutions depend for the sake of performing their functions. The “copying” 
of institutions approach tries to bypass, or at any rate shorten, this period of 
gestation and slow maturation. While certainly being anti-Stalinist in 
substance, this instrumental approach to institution building comes often 
close to being Stalinist in method. That is not to suggest that institution 
designers in post-Communist societies could actually afford to wait. They 
rarely can, given the pressing economic needs and the lack of legitimate 
political authority in their countries. It is only to suggest that “copied” and 
transplanted institutions that lack the moral and cultural infrastructure on 
which the “original” can rely are likely to yield very different and often 
counter-intentional results, in which case ever more hectic and short-
breathed further designs (with all the familiar pathologies of overshooting, 
stop-go-cycles, short lived governing elites, and an oscillation on the mass 
level between extreme forms of political expressivism and an apathetic 
disdain for politics) must be expected as a consequence. 
Hyper-rationality is just one of two weaknesses inherent in the idea of 
institutional design. The other weakness has to do with the fact that in the 
modern world “designed” institutions are almost always “successor” 
institutions. They are not built on a tabula rasa. Successor institutions are 
affected by the long arm of their predecessors. These predecessors may 
have failed in one or both of the two senses in which institutions may fail, 
failure of socialization and preference formation or failure of performing their 
function. But there may still be traces and remnants of the old institutional 
arrangement in the presence of which the new institutions cannot function 
properly. In spite of the fact that state socialist institutions have clearly failed 
to generate socialist preferences (to say nothing about “socialist man”), they 
have generated a state of mind, a set of expectations and assumptions that 
turn out to be inimical to the growth of democratic capitalist and civil 
institutions. This state of mind, regardless whether it has been cultivated by 
the last fifty years of experience of state socialist institutions or the 
experience of the last five hundred years of precarious and often failed po-
litical, economic and cultural modernization processes, is described by 
many authors (e.g. Morawski, Schöpflin, Sztompka) as a combination of 
apathy, depletion of communal bonds, passivity, unwillingness to accept 
responsibility, atomization, lack of respect for formal rules, and a pervasive 
“grab and run attitude” toward economic gain (Neuber 1992: 10). 
Furthermore, economic attitudes are shaped by zero-sum-assumptions as 
well as the expectation that success must be due to patronage and 
cooptation, not effort. 
Such elements of the cultural infrastructure on which institutions must 
rely are not only time consuming to consolidate (as Dahrendorf and many 
others have argued), but equally time consuming to abolish. This 
infrastructure can perhaps fruitfully be compared to a computer software, 
with the formal rules, jurisdictions and licenses of the institution itself being 
the hardware. But in the case of institutions, the software on which they de-
pend for their operation is not easily exchanged and replaced, as it is 
generated by the hardware itself in the process in which people “get used to” 
and “make sense of” or “cope with” the institutions, thus adopting a set of 
standards, obligations, and expectations that in Weber’s terminology is 
referred to as the “spirit” (“Geist”) of institutions. This includes, in addition to 
moral commitments, familiarity with the institutions, codes of appropriate 
conduct, a reasonable measure of trust in their proper functioning, and the 
like. 
Let me illustrate this point by distinguishing three variants of the 
operational meaning of “equality.” In a liberal polity, it emphasizes equality 
before the law: no one should be denied the rights that everyone else enjoys. 
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In a more social democratic version it shades into a distributive meaning that 
also looks at, in addition to rights, material conditions or outcomes. More 
specifically, it is a “downward-looking” notion of equality akin to Rawls’ 
difference principle which highlights the moral intuition that those below “us” 
should be granted priority in having their condition improved. What seems to 
prevail in post-Communist societies, however, is an upward-looking variant of 
distributive concerns, which is itself derived from the political culture of the 
old regime. What this semantic of “equality” boils down to is the envy -driven 
notion that “they” are evidently richer than “we,” and the state should 
therefore prevent them from getting ahead even further – the authoritarian 
conclusion. But the same semantic can also give rise to an ultra-libertarian 
reasoning: Unless the state does so, “we” are entitled to use every means 
available (including illegal means) to get ahead as well.18 At the very least, 
the tolerance for distributional differences is extremely limited. 
“Designed” institutions suffer from a dual handicap: They have an 
architect and they are successors. Two conclusions can be drawn from the 
discussion of this dual liability from which the activity of “founding” 
institutions suffers, hyper-rationality and the long arm of the past. As far as 
the first of these liabilities is concerned, the ideal situation for the “founding” 
of institutions seems to be one in which no explicit “engineering” is called 
for, but where there is a rich vegetation of inherited institutional patterns 
which already enjoy the allegiance of relevant actors – an allegiance that can 
be further cultivated by the activity that has been described as “institutional 
gardening.” But as far as the second of these liabilities is concerned, namely 
the “long arm of the past,” it is just the opposite conclusion that must be 
drawn: the more the situation conforms to a notion of tabula rasa, the more 
readily and easily will the newly designed set of institutions win the loyalty of 
constituents and unfold its beneficial functions. Would-be institution 
designers certainly cannot have it both ways. 
3. Challenges, Breakdowns, and Survival Responses 
The breakdown of institutions can occur in response to either of three 
challenges. First they may fail to inculcate the norms and preferences that 
condition the loyalty of members. In this case, institutions stop to “make 
sense” to members and to be “taken seriously” by them or by the wider 
social domain for which an institution claims validity, and consequently the 
institution loses support and recognition. Scandals and cases of corruption 
in which representative leaders of an institution become seen as betraying 
core values are particularly powerful causes of the sudden loss of an 
institution’s credibility. The same effect can be caused by slow cultural 
changes, which are often referred to as “secularization” in the case of 
religious institutions.  
Second, institutions may decay because alternatives emerge which 
allow for the satisfaction of those needs and the fulfillment of those functions 
over which the institution used to hold a monopoly. An example is the 
institution of the dues collector in trade unions and other working class 
organizations who would visit members at home, provide information, social 
control, and advice, and also would symbolize the faithful, committed and 
loyal example of a “good” union member and of working class values in 
general. This institution has disappeared a long time ago, as the payment of 
dues (as many other payments) is increasingly processed through bank 
accounts without the use of cash. The same applies to the institution of the 
                                                                 
18 Needless to say, both the authoritarian and the libertarian conclusion will give rise to what 
Rose (1992) has aptly termed an “uncivil economy.” 
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local athletics club as it is being marginalized through commercial fitness 
centers, on the one hand, and events of professional spectator sports, on 
the other. The rise of new opportunities must be distinguished from the rise 
of opportunity costs. The institutions of downtown vegetable markets or, for 
that matter, department stores, have become questionable, given the boom 
in central city real estate prices and transportation problems, as well as the 
availability of the alternative of large peripheral shopping malls.  
Thirdly, institutions may break down because of their manifest failure in 
performing the functions with which they are charged. For instance, the state 
is an institution whose existence is contingent upon its capacity to protect 
and control territorial borders, and marriage is an institution that prescribes 
the exclusion of third persons from sexual and other interactions. Failure to 
perform these functions will thus lead to the breakdown of particular 
instances of institutions (i.e., particular states and marriages), as opposed 
to the institution itself. A case of the latter is the disappearance of guilds 
which regulated all aspects of particular trades in medieval European cities 
(including the personnel admitted, the quantity, quality and price of the 
goods produced, conditions of sale, codes of conduct etc.). Other cases of 
defunct institutions are those regulating political prerogatives of the nobility 
or, perhaps (and hopefully) at some point soon, the Italian Mafia. 
It is worth stressing that the three types of causes that I have specified 
may lead to the breakdown of an institution, but that such breakdown is by 
no means a necessary consequence of the presence of one or even all of 
these causes. In cases it is not, institutions adopt survival strategies which 
are themselves an major mode of institutional change, as captured by the 
Lampedusa-principle: “If things are to stay as they are, everything must 
change. ” Instances of such survival strategies are goal displacement (e.g., 
the NATO adopting new missions in the field of academic research and 
environmental protection), change of constituencies (churches and religious 
sects targeting on young people) or change of institutional means (as in the 
case of extreme acts of violence that occurred on the Square of Heavenly 
Peace in Peking on June 4th, 1989). 
But these survival strategies might be seriously self-defeating in their 
outcome, which I think can be shown to have been the case with the 
breakdown of the Communist regime in the Soviet Union and the other 
CMEA-countries. Why has communism failed? Although we are still far from 
understanding the causes and consequences of this momentous 
breakdown, I submit that explanations of the breakdown itself can be 
grouped in several broad categories.  
Two of them suffer from the slight embarrassment that, at least ideally, 
today’s explanatory hypotheses should have been the basis of yesterday’s 
predictions, and that hardly anyone predicted what now must be explained. 
This embarrassment can be dealt with by claiming that the breakdown of 
Communist regimes was caused by external forces (such as hostile military, 
economic, political, or communication strategies of Western countries) and 
that it had little or nothing to do with institutional structures of the regime 
itself. This is clearly an unpromising approach as it begs the question why 
the institutional structures of the regimes itself were so weak and vulnerable 
as to become incapable of dealing with these externally generated 
challenges. Second, we might argue that the breakdown was ultimately 
caused by a single person (the only conceivable candidate being Michail 
Gorbatshew) or a small group of his followers. In spite of considerable 
evidence that is available in support of this reading of history, it ultimately 
must fail because it, too, ignores the question of which institutional 
arrangements and rules made this kind of person(s), as well as their rise to 
top positions of power, at all possible.  
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Again, we are back to an institutional approach, of which two variants 
are available. One starts with institutional failures of social integration, the 
other with failures of system integration. Let us consider them in turn. 
The first type of explanation claims that the failure of state socialism is 
due to the failure of its institutions to generate congruent motivations, or at 
least to check incongruent ones. A famous battle cry of 19th century Italian 
risorgimento nationalism was Massimo d’Azeglio’s dictum that “We have 
made Italy, now we have to make Italians. ” In other words, a condition of 
stability of the new regime is seen in its ability to inculcate a sense of 
loyalty, faithfulness and obligation towards the rules of the institutional 
regime. Similarly, “the feasibility of socialism must rest on the assumption 
that socialization of the means of production causes individuals to adopt 
socialist preferences” (Przeworski 1991: 116). If it can be shown that there is 
a systematic and incurable incapacity of state socialist institutions to 
generate congruent motivations among its strategic core agents such as 
planners, managers, workers, and households, all of which will impair the 
necessary level of cooperation and may even breed cynicism as a prevailing 
outcome of endogenous preference formation. Furthermore, the 
undemocratic and repressive means by which socialist institutions try to 
compensate for this deficiency will usually add to the problem rather than 
alleviating it. If all of this can be shown to be true for systematic reasons, 
this pathology of social integration is the key to explaining the system’s 
breakdown. 
The alternative, though by no means incompatible, explanation is that 
state socialism has failed, for equally systematic reasons, on the level of 
system integration. It simply does not function sufficiently well as an 
economic system. Its failure is one of coordination. The model case of this 
kind of failure occurs when it is simply not possible to deliver the right spare 
part at the right time to the place where it is needed. Generally speaking, 
the state socialist system of planning, allocation and distribution that 
abdicates the principle of “profit maximization” has been blamed for its 
consistent failure to minimize losses. There was simply no legal, economic, 
intellectual, or political mechanism to declare and render elements of the 
system obsolete. In spite of its claim to being based upon  “scientific” 
knowledge, the system, lacking as it does appropriate devices of accounting 
and self-monitoring, simply does not accumulate enough knowledge about 
itself in order to cope with and correct its own inherent wastefulness. 
As long as institutions suffer from just one of these complementary 
deficiencies, the respective other one may well be able to make up for this 
limited failure. For instance, if output failures are met with a strong sense of 
loyalty, hope, patience, heroism, and optimistic expectations, breakdown 
may well be avoided. (Cuba of the sixties may be an example of this 
extreme.) Conversely, if output is booming, loyalty may appear to a large 
extent dispensable. It is difficult to speculate about marginal rates of 
substitution between social and system integration. At any rate, the two 
complementary solutions of appealing to people’s endurance under 
conditions of severe shortage and of buying a measure of self-interested 
loyalty by delivering an abundance of goods are each likely to fail at some 
point, at which the latent imbalance of the two functions of institutions 
becomes manifest. 
In order to avoid either of these two emergencies as well as their 
cumulative interaction, the Gorbatchew reforms of the mid-eighties seem to 
have relied on a reformist way out that he and his supporters believed was 
compatible with the overall institutional structure of the Soviet empire. He 
introduced, under vague labels such as “perestroika” and “glasnost,” 
supposedly marginal institutional alterations and alternatives which, however, 
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in actuality turned out to be veritable explosives. Instead of instigating new 
optimism, trust, and loyalty, he seems to have caused panic in the 
economic and political elites at home and abroad. And instead of improving 
the mode of coordination of the Soviet political economy, the reforms created 
ever greater turbulence and stagnation. We thus see that not only 
breakdown can provoke survival strategies, but miscalculated though well-
intentioned rescue operations can accelerate breakdown. 
4. Critique 
I have argued before that institutions depend on the meaning that is 
accorded to them by the actors. They must not only be known to exist, but 
“make sense” to actors and even oblige them. Such obligation flows from 
implicit theories by which the proponents of an institutional order defend it 
and try to cope with challenges. If these justificatory effort succeeds, a 
sense of loyalty is generated that will lead actors to ignore some of their own 
conflicting interests and submit to the obligations stipulated. 
Asking the right persons the right questions in public can be a powerful 
device to expose the weakness of those implicit theories. Why, for instance, 
should the office of the priest, bishop etc. be the monopoly of the male 
gender? Why should German nationality (which is a precondition of the civil 
service status of Beamte) be a prerequisite for becoming a mailmen and 
cop? Critique can undermine the bindingness of obligations and ultimately 
demolish institutions and trigger their breakdown. This is most easily ac-
complished in the case that institutions are defended by reference to 
empirical arguments alone, such as the claim that “everyone else” is 
actually complying with the institutional order or that it has “always” been 
honored. Such claims by themselves, apart from being probably wrong in 
any particular instance, cannot by itself serve as the foundation of any 
bindingness, apart from the case of conventions, which by definition are self-
enforcing and have little if any potential for conflict. Other, more demanding 
arguments in defense of particular institutions invoke moral obligations, 
widely shared values, or consequences that are generally held to be 
desirable. All of these claims, if questioned, must be backed up with rather 
elaborate and explicit theories, and the validity of these theories can again 
be tested and questioned by critique.  
Such critique corresponds to one of the three varieties of institutional 
breakdown that I have just discussed. It can (a) either try to challenge the 
normative premises that the institution invokes, or it can (b) try to 
demonstrate that these normative premises, if valid, might also be 
implemented by alternative institutional patterns, or that (c) the 
consequences claimed in support of a particular institutional pattern are not, 
on balance, as unquestionably desirable as it is claimed in defense of an 
institution (or, if evidently desirable, are not actually achieved by its 
operation).  
Let me illustrate each of these three modes of critique with an example 
from the field of social policy. First, most pension systems have the feature 
that benefits are earnings-graduated, which is usually being justified in terms 
of a equitable reward. If we can demonstrate, however, that most pensioners 
from the upper income categories derive additional old age income from 
sources other than pensions, namely from savings and other assets they 
have been able to build out of their relatively high market income, 
equivalence in terms of pensions becomes a less compelling normative 
premise, because it virtually amounts to doubling the reward for the well-to-
do income categories. Second, instead of paying unemployment benefits to 
jobless people, the supply of labor and hence unemployment might be 
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reduced by the alternative of large scale anticyclical programs of mandatory 
continuing education and other statutory leaves from regular employed work, 
with the balance of budgetary costs and labor productivity being perhaps 
even demonstrably better than is the case with regular unemployment 
insurance. Third, and concerning consequences, if it could be demonstrated 
that there is a zero-correlation between marginal increases of the total health 
budget and marginal improvements of independently measured subjective or 
objective indicators of health, the conclusion is warranted that either what 
(the budgetary increments of) the institutions of the health system serve is 
not actually “health” or the health they do serve is not unequivocally worth 
serving. 
To be sure, such critical counter-arguments against the claims of 
institutions to validity and loyalty are themselves contingent upon whether 
they “make sense” to those to whom they are addressed. At the very least, 
however, they are likely to put some learning pressure upon the institutional 
complex in question. As a consequence of this pressure, they may instigate 
some search for survival strategies on the part of the institutional elites 
which are being challenged by the critique. By stimulating this search, and 
by subjecting its outcomes to reiterated critical scrutiny, we are, on this 
indirect way, probably as close as we can possibly come to the hyper-
rational ideal of “designing” institutions. 
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